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FLOYD E. WESTON dba METABOLIC 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE and 
FORMULA TECHNOLOGY, a Nevada 
corporation, 
Defendants and : 
Appellees. : 
: Case No. 950481 
Priority No. 15 
Assigned from Utah Supreme 
Court, Case No. 950132 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appellant Gull Laboratories, Inc. (hereinafter "Gull") hereby submits this Response to 
the Petition for Rehearing submitted by Appellees Floyd E. Weston dba Metabolic Research 
Institute and Formula Technology (hereinafter "Weston and Formula Technology"). 
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INTRODUCTION 
In presenting the Petition for Rehearing, Weston and Formula [Technology have violated 
the cardinal rule of appellate procedure, which is to support "al} statements of fact and 
references to the proceedings below . . . by citations to the record . , . . . " Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(7). Of the fourteen separately stated and listed "Facts," not a jingle one gives a citation 
to the Record for support. It is submitted that one of the principal reasons for the lack of 
citation is that the Record does not support the claimed facts. Indeed, Weston and Formula 
Technology are raising in their Petition matters that have no supfport whatsoever. As a 
consequence, the Court should summarily dismiss the Petition. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE "FACTS" CLAIMED BY WESTON AND FORMULA [TECHNOLOGY HAVE 
NO BASIS WHATSOEVER 
The Court will recall that at oral argument in this case, counsel for Weston and Formula 
Technology attempted to claim as being facts certain matters which at best were outside of the 
Record and at worst were simply not true. The Court admonished! counsel for Weston and 
Formula Technology to avoid such statements. Unfortunately, the lesson does not appear to 
have been learned. The same misrepresentations made in oral arguntient as well as additional 
misstatements are now made in the Petition for Rehearing. The follqwing are examples: 
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Record clearly rebuts that contention. The Court's attention is directed to the Order in question 
which has a mailing certificate dated September 22, 1994, showing a copy of the Order being 
sent to Mr. Zoll that day. (R. at 602.) What is not in the Record is any affidavit or other 
evidence of any kind that Mr. Zoll did not receive a copy of that Order. Also there is nothing 
in Judge Rigtrup's ruling which indicates in any way that Mr. Zoll did not receive a copy of the 
Order shortly after its date of service. Also not found in the Record is any objection to the 
Order by Mr. Zoll at any time. Therefore, the uncontroverted testimony, as supported by the 
Record, is that the Order signed by Judge Rigtrup on September 28, 1994 was sent to Mr. Zoll 
on or about September 22, 1994 and that he received it shortly thereafter. 
2. Mr. Zoll claims he had insufficient time to object to the Order before the October 
3rd payment date. (See Petition for Rehearing, Statement of Facts, No. 7.) As noted above, 
the Order was mailed to Mr. Zoll on September 22, 1994. Assuming three days for mailing, 
the five days in which to object expired on September 30, 1994. Even giving Mr. Zoll the 
benefit of the weekend thereafter, he still had all day October 3, 1994 in which to object before 
the payment was due. Mr. Zoll improperly counts the five days running from after the date the 
Order was signed by the court, which position has no support in any rule. Nevertheless, as 
noted, the Record is devoid of any objection at any time. 
3. It is claimed that the Order was not prepared as provided by Rule 4-504 of the 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration and as ordered by the court. (See Petition for Rehearing, 
Statement of Facts, Nos. 2, 5, and 9.) Contrary to the assertion of Weston and Formula 
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Technology, at no time did Judge Rigtrup order that the Stipulation first be approved as to form 
before it would be submitted to the court. That is what Mr. Zoll had proposed, but his proposal 
was never accepted. Nowhere in the transcript of the stipulation of September 21, 1994 does 
Judge Rigtrup require the proposed order to be first sent to Mr. Zoll for approval as to form. 
Nor did the parties stipulate that procedure as a requirement of the settlement. Further, Rule 
4-504 does not require an approval as to form. Rather, the only requirement is that a copy of 
the proposed order be served upon opposing counsel who then has five days after service to 
object to the same. 
II. THE DATE AN ORDER IS SIGNED IS NOT DETERMINATIVE OF 
WHEN THE TIME FOR OBJECTION BEGINS TO RUN 
In making the claim that they never had property opportunity to object to the Order in 
question, Weston and Formula Technology count the date when Judge Rigtrup signed the Order 
as the beginning of the five day period in which to object. That date is immaterial with regard 
to filing an objection. The date which starts the running of the five day period is the date of 
service on opposing counsel. Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504(2). 
In the case of Tolboe Const, v. Staker Paving & Const., 682 P.2d 843 (Utah 1984), the 
plaintiff argued that because an order had been signed by the judge before the five day period 
for making objections had expired, it was not a binding order. The Supreme Court disagreed, 
noting as follows: 
The fact that the court signed the documents prior to plaintiff's 
submission of objections and prior to the expiration of five days 
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from the service of the documents, does not constitute a violation 
of this latter requirement. The requirement as well as the rule 
itself are binding only upon counsel, not upon the trial court. 
IcL at 848-49 (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court found that there was no prejudice because any objections that were 
submitted still could be heard as long as they were made within the five days after service. IcL 
Since the date which starts the running of the five day period for objections is the date of the 
service of the order on opposing counsel, there was thus ample opportunity to object to the 
Order prior to October 3rd. However, no objection was filed much less within the five days. 
Under the circumstances, Rule 4-504(2) was not violated in any degree since the test is whether 
objections to an order were filed within five days after service, regardless of whether the order 
has been signed by a court. 
In the case at bar, the Record shows that service was effectuated by mailing on 
September 22, 1994, but Weston and Formula Technology filed no objection to the Order at all. 
As such, there can be no claim of lack of opportunity to object or a violation of Rule 4-504. 
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III. A BINDING STIPULATION WAS REACHED IN OPEN COURT 
The Petition for Rehearing completely ignores the fact that the parties, acting through 
their attorneys, had reached an agreement and consented to that agreement unequivocally in open 
court. As this Court has already ruled in its Memorandum Decision and as made so abundantly 
clear by all the cases which have addressed the subject, the parties' understanding is immaterial 
if they have authorized their agents to enter into an agreement and that agreement is 
unambiguous and unequivocal. Thus, once Mr. Zoll was empowered by his clients to represent 
them, and once Mr. Zoll entered into an unequivocal stipulation on the record in court, the deal 
was done. Although an Order was prepared, submitted, and signed, that step was not necessary 
in order to create an effective and binding stipulation. (See Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, Rule 4-504(8).) Therefore, even though Gull maintains and the Record supports 
the proposition that the Order was properly prepared, submitted to opposing counsel, and 
properly signed by the court without any objection raised by Weston and Formula Technology, 
nevertheless even if the Order had not been prepared or the judge had not signed it, there was 
still a stipulation which was binding on the parties. That stipulation is so specific that there 
cannot be any mistake about its terms. 
Even if there was an objection to the Order, such an objection could have been made 
only on the basis that the Order did not reflect the ruling of the court or the stipulation of the 
parties. In this case, the Order reflected exactly the agreement of the parties, as evidenced by 
the transcript of the stipulation between the parties. Moreover, Weston and Formula Technology 
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have never claimed any error in the wording of the Order. Rather, Mr. Weston has claimed that 
he did not perfectly communicate with Mr. Zoll about needing board approval of the stipulation. 
As this Court said in its Memorandum Decision, the important issue in this case is what was 
agreed upon between the attorneys in open court. That is the basis upon which the court can 
determine whether there was a meeting of the mind. All of the judges who have reviewed this 
matter, including Judge Rigtrup, are unanimous in stating that there was no ambiguity in that 
settlement agreement. 
It is clear that at the time of the stipulation, Mr. Zoll did not condition his stipulation on 
board approval or condition the payment date on any subsequent event. If in fact he had been 
told by Mr. Weston that board approval had to be first obtained1, he never breathed a word of 
that requirement in open court as part of the settlement stipulation. However, assuming that 
board approval was a requirement, both Mr. Weston and Mr. Zoll's conduct thereafter belie 
board approval being a condition. Considering the fact that the October 3rd date was repeated 
so many times during the settlement stipulation, at the very least each would have had some kind 
of obligation to check back with the other prior to October 3rd to discuss the status of the 
alleged board approval and to convey that approval or disapproval to Gull. Inasmuch as the first 
communication on the subject came after October 3rd (and after the Motion to Reinstate had 
^ince Mr. Weston was a defendant personally, he obviously did not need some mythical board approval to 
commit himself to the settlement. Further, since he was the president of Formula Technology, as well as its major 
shareholder, it is hard to believe he needed board approval to settle a lawsuit. 
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been personally served upon Mr. Zoll)(R. at 613), it makes suspect any claim that Weston and 
Formula Technology were waiting for board approval. 
Whatever secret information Mr. Weston had in his mind on September 21, 1994, or 
however imperfectly he communicated with Mr. Zoll, Weston and Formula Technology have 
established no basis whatsoever for claiming that they should be excused from the binding 
agreement entered into by Mr. Zoll as their agent. The stipulation should be upheld. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE THE DISCRETION TO CHANGE 
THE TERMS OF THE STIPULATION 
The argument of Weston and Formula Technology that Judge Rigtrup had "broad 
discretion" to modify or excuse non-performance of a settlement stipulation has no basis in the 
law. The "broad discretion" to set aside stipulations discussed in United Factors v. T.C. 
Associates. Inc.. 445 P.2d 766 (Utah 1968) is with regard to "ordinary stipulations" and not 
with regard to a "stipulation for settlement." In the latter case, the basis for setting it aside 
requires "a showing equivalent to that necessary to set aside a contract in equity." IcL at 767. 
Since the concept of setting aside settlement stipulations has heretofore been fully briefed, 
the court is referred to the Brief of Appellant, pp. 14-15, for further discussion of this point. 
V. GULL SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES 
A petition for rehearing suggests that the court did not understand the case when it was 
first presented to it or that there is some important precedent which it overlooked. Utah R. 
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App. P. 35. Both circumstances are extremely rare because of the thoroughness of appellate 
courts in reviewing the material submitted and also because appellate courts have to rely on the 
record and cannot find evidence outside of the record. In this instance, the Petition for 
Rehearing has sought to reargue many of the same points made in the original Appellees' Brief, 
spiced up by unsupported allegations. The Petition does not raise any matters supported by the 
Record which were not argued in the briefs and considered by this Court in reaching its 
decision. Thus there is no merit whatsoever to the Petition. Under the circumstances, therefore, 
it is submitted that the assertion the Petition has been made in good faith and not for purposes 
of delay is not true. Gull is entitled to its attorney's fees for having had to respond thereto. 
CONCLUSION 
In its Memorandum Decision, this Court has correctly stated the law pertaining to the 
situation at hand. To try avoid the consequences of that ruling, we have now been presented 
with a Petition full of misstatements while rehashing decided points. This Court should not 
condone that type of action. The Petition should be denied and this Court should award Gull 
its attorney's fees for having to respond thereto. 
Respectfully Submitted. 
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DATED this _J_ day of April, 1996. 
KESLER & RUST 
Joseph] 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
gull\replypet wes 
AW^ 1 c^A c^  
10 
